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Abstract:  The study examines a sample of 20 teaching and research Romanian hospitals, 
located in Bucharest, during the period 2001 – 2005, in terms of their efficiency and influence 
on their neighbouring health care units, expressed as an idiosyncratic form of market 
competition. Perspectives in case price competition will become a differentiation factor among 
hospitals, as health care migrates from the public to the for-profit sector will be addressed to, 
as well as the analysis of a possible switch, in the teaching and research hospitals’ (TRH) 
policy, from focusing on technical efficiency to trying to compensate their low operating 
margins by offering more unverifiable quality, which will be appreciated by the patients suiting 
a different, now emerging, customer profile. 
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1.  Objectives of the study 
 
The aim of the present study is to apply econometric methods for estimating 
hospital efficiency models on a sample of 20 Romanian TRH (Teaching and Research 
Hospitals), to draw conclusions regarding the frontier of efficiency, and suggest ways 
of action for the health care units which fall below the frontier. Additionally, we are 
interested in the proportion in which the level of hospital performance influences its 
market share which, in its turn, influences costs, and whether there can be set a 
multiple correlation, using appropriate concepts of public sector efficiency and social 
marketing. In the process of privatization and marketization of what used to be public 
goods, in what Michael Power (1997) named „the audit society”, this relationship, 
between  objective and accountable level of hospital efficiency, and its subjective 
image, „sold” to the patients, is extremely important for the perspectives of a medical 
system undergoing substantial transformations.  
The European competition (patients choosing foreign clinics for diagnosis 
and, more and more, for treatment), the wider availability of information – via the 
internet, via marketing policies of competing hospitals, and the changing preferences 
of the patients who begin to act as consumers, demanding quality they can afford 
become challenges to be considered by the Romanian Teaching and Research 
Hospitals, formerly bastions of prestige and exclusivity on the market. As Trogen and 
Yavas (2002) point out, the once sacrosanct image of the hospital is eroding.  
In this context, the questions about their efficiency and cost-effectiveness, 
which have always, diffusely, existed, become sound and necessary research premises. 




2.  State of the Art 
 
The emergence of the New Public Management, which adapts to the public 
sector managerial models functioning in the private organizations (Ferlie et al., 1996), 
led to a reconsidering of the concepts of efficiency and effectiveness in public 
institutions. They are, no longer, unlimitedly autonomous, as they have to account, by 
meeting a specific quality threshold, for the budget they spend, and for the loyalty they 
demand. Still, the rendering of these institutions accountable doesn’t follow as the 
night the day. The process is particularly difficult because, as McNulty (2002, pp. 
445-446) states, hospitals combine, in their culture, „values of both clinical autonomy 
and managerial control”, which results in a high potential for power conflicts, as 
„doctors resist managerial attempts to make their  activity predictable, transparent, and 
standard.” As an anecdote, which is not at all amusing, Lagasse et al. reported, in 
1995, that 8% of the anaesthetic errors in the world are due to human faults, and 92% 
to system malfunctions. Under these conditions, the need to see why good 
professionals do not perform to their maximum capacity, considering the restrictions 
of a given system, becomes of key interest to the management of healthcare 
institutions.  
Quality in healthcare, which is the never approached priority of all political 
programs, was defined by Øvretveit (2000) as the exceeding of costumer expectations 
by patient quality, professional quality and management quality. These three 
components correspond, roughly, to the relational (consumer) capital, human capital 
and structural capital, the branches of the intellectual capital (Roos and Roos, 1997). 
As hospitals are moving, like any other organization, from the intensive use of 
tangibles to the intensive use of intangibles, this intellectual capital existing at their 
disposal has to be defined and evaluated, and strategies for its adequate development 
must be put in place. Habersam and Piper (2003) have shown that intangible resources 
are highly relevant, in the case of hospitals, as patients are more involved than other 
categories of customers, demanding a higher quality of service and, also, their level of 
education tends to become higher, only if we take into consideration the information 
they gather from alternative sources, regarding their disease. 
Still, having in mind that hospitals can hardly evaluate their costs and find 
ways to reduce them, by applying principles which proved salutary in other types of 
organizations, the evaluation of the intangibles can’t be done in the first place. A 
manager who would like to know in which way the hospital he/ she manages can 
become an intelligent architecture which integrates patients quality, professional 
quality and management quality, by reconciling all the three forms of intellectual 
capital, has to start with knowing exactly what is cost-effective and what is not, 
considering that patients are spending less time in hospitals than they used to, and out-
patient care tends to be preferred.   Estimation of Romanian hospitals efficiency in relation to hospital market competition 
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The concern for measuring teaching and research hospitals efficiency arose as, 
from a moment on, the social mission of these institutions, rather than organizations 
(North, 1990), which, at a time, provide healing services and promote academic 
excellence, is at risk (Reuter, 1998). A study conducted in the United States, between 
1994 and 2000 (The Lewin Group Analysis, 2000) proves that the decrease in the 
TRH aggregate financial performance was more significant than the one experienced 
by non-teaching hospitals, even after adjusting the results with an index of case 
severity, given that, usually, TRH treat more complicated cases (Koenig, Dobson, 
Book and Chen, 2005).  This means that the academic functions a TRH pursues are 
endangered, in a market-driven society, because they are not cost-efficient, since less 
than half of the American TRH were able, in 2000, to keep their positive operating 





Figure 1. Operating margins for hospitals 
 
Source: The Lewin Group Analysis of the AHA Annual Survey Data, 2000 
where:   All Hospitals’ Total Margins;   TRH Total Margins;   TRH Operating 
Margins;  All Hospitals’ Operating Margins.  
 
 
Based on these findings, and on the presumption that the performance of the 
public, committed to teaching and research activities, hospitals will grow even worse 
in the coming years, the Lewin Group developed an econometric regression efficiency 
model, measuring efficiency as average cost per case, taking into account the case mix 
index (intensity of care), the teaching intensity, and the payer mix index (who pays for 
the medical services).  
In Romania, the state, by the system of national health assurance, is the most 
prominent payer for the services offered by public hospitals. Still, as private assurance 
systems emerge, patients will be redirected towards hospitals with lower costs, and Management & Marketing 
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this influences a hospital’s market share and, consequently, the level of total 
discharges made to the hospital. But this is not the only issue to be taken into account, 
in terms of patients’ preference for a hospital. A service a hospital sells in a market, at 
a price P, has both a verifiable quality, from the point of view of the customer, Q1, and 
a non-verifiable quality – staff behaviour, attention given to patients, general climate 
etc., which the clients expect to be high. Glaeser and Shleifer (1998) developed a 
model for the analysis of not-for-profit hospitals position in the market. After selling a 
service, the hospital may choose to spend effort E to make an innovation, reducing 
costs by K (E). The total costs after the innovation will be C (Q1) – K (E). But, the 
innovation may reduce non-verifiable quality by mE (m = constant), while verifiable 
quality remains Q1. For instance, an information system designed to report in real time 
the free beds available and to place new comers accordingly, saving time, may create 
the patients the impression they are not sufficiently looked after. If E denotes the 
patient’s expectation of the level of unverifiable effort, then his/her willingness to pay 
for the services equals q+ Q1 – mE, where q is a constant of the market. In this case, a 
hospital entrepreneur’s choice for operating the hospital as a not-for-profit 
organization (that is, selling at a higher price, with a lower cost reducing effort than a 
for-profit), depends on the clients’ willingness to pay for non-verifiable quality. This 
can be approximated, in the market, as proportion of high-income and high-educated 
people (Duggan, 1998). Accordingly, flow demand models have been designed 
(Oliveira, 2002). As far as hospital competition is concerned, hospitals in competitive 
markets have 20% higher costs than hospitals with little or no neighbouring 
competition (Dranove, Shanley and White, 1993). The relationship found by the three 
researchers between hospital mark-up, hospital characteristics and hospital 
concentration is: 
 
Mit = Bt + Bz Zit + Bx Xit + BH Hit + Ei                         (1) 
 
where Mit is the hospital’s mark-up for a mix of hospital services sold by hospital i 
during the period t. Zit is a vector of hospital’s i characteristics, permitting it to charge 
a certain price. Xit is the vector of other hospitals’ characteristics, which might affect 
the mark-up. Hit is the Herfindahl index in hospital i’s market. The healthcare market 
differs from other markets in some important respects (Gaynor and Vogt, 2000): 
services are highly differentiated, information is imperfect, government regulation is 
extensive, and most of the services are provided by not-for-profit organizations. This 
is way competition on this market doesn’t necessarily lead, as we would expect, to 
lower prices and better quality. In fact, hospital competition rather results in social 
waste (Propper et al., 2004), as the price is not paid directly by each client, for the 
particular services he/she bought, so that the decision to employ better equipments and 
to invest in costly procedures burdens the state budget and is paid by all the insured, 
indistinctly.  Estimation of Romanian hospitals efficiency in relation to hospital market competition 
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These are sensitive problems, especially for the Romanian healthcare system, 
were the correlation between efficiency measurement, impact on market share, and the 
influence of competition on the overall costs which, in their turn, influence 
performance, needs to be investigated. 
 
3.  Data and methodology  
 
  In this study, in order to prove how the increased competitiveness in the 
healthcare market reduces the market share of the teaching and research hospitals, 
which have a rather low cost efficiency, and to suggest ways of counterbalancing this 
tendency by offering more non-verifiable quality, we used data from the National 
Statistics Institute, from the Department of Medical Statistics, and longitudinal data 
collected from a sample of 20 teaching and research hospitals, located in Bucharest, 
out of which five are also emergency care units. For estimating the market competition 
among competitors, the usual measure is the Hirschman- Herfindahl index: 
 
HHIk = Σj  sj
2 I (djk ≤  Rk)                         (2) 
 
where djk is the distance between hospital j and hospital k, Rk is the distance boundary 
defining hospital k’s market, and I is an indicator equal to 1 when hospital j is located 
nearer than the distance boundary. S is the share of the market owned by each of the 
competitors.  
  In our case, the use of this index is problematic, since it is difficult to estimate 
the market share of a large, teaching and research hospital, given that more than 60% 
of the patients (according to a survey we have conducted in 2004/2005 in Fundeni 
Hospital) of such a health care unit located in a particular site from Bucharest come, 
actually, from all over the country, and the distance between hospitals is a good 
predictor of the competition among them only in the case of emergencies. In this latter 
case, out of a) accessibility and b) economic reasons – transportation costs, the closest 
emergency care hospital is preferred, unless the severity of the case (estimated by the 
Charlson index) asks for a particular destination (for instance, Floreasca Emergency 
Care Unit). This Charlson index includes 19 categories of co-morbidities, with their 
associated weight, measuring the risk to decease within a certain time interval.  Still, 
we may assume that a teaching and research hospital competes with the same type 
hospitals located in the same geographical area, in our case, with the other TRH from 
Bucharest. A profile of the patient flow in each hospital should also be predicted, but 
this again rises problems because of the fragmentation of services: some patients are 
acute cases and, if they cure and, after a period, come again for a different illness, are 
recorded as different patients, some other are chronic patients, and their coming backs 
to hospital are recorded as revisits, but they may change, for various reasons, the Management & Marketing 
 
102
treating hospital in the meanwhile. Some other patients are fidelized because they need 
a particular treatment (for chronic leukemia, for instance), which they can’t obtain 
unless they are under regular supervision in a national clinic in charge with the 
prescription of that medication, and so on. Recent studies (Town, 2003) have proved 
that the best solution in these cases would be the use, in the formula of the index, of a 
fixed R of 75%, which translates as „which are the other hospitals in the region from 
which 75% of hospital k’s patients are drawn?”. 
  Let us assume that HO represents the health outcomes of the hospitalization in 
a certain healthcare unit, depending on the care intensity, which is related to the 
teaching intensity of that hospital (computed as students and residents to beds ratio), in 
the sense that the DME (direct medical education) costs should be subtracted (Lewin 
Group, 2000) for computing the cost per case, which is an indicator of the intensity of 
care. The resulting equation, adapted from the Lewin Group’s model, is the following: 
 
Log C/Ci = α0 + Σ αj log(X ji)  + εii            ( 3 )  
                                                                             j 
where C/C is the cost per case, α0  and  αj  are estimated coefficients, and Xji are 
independent variables. εii is the error.  
 
  The health outcomes verify the equation: 
 
HO = α Xji + β HHIkt + uk +  εi t               (4) 
 
where Xji are the independent variables, HHIkt is the Hirschman- Herfindahl index for 
hospital k in period t, uk is the unverifiable quality delivered by hospital k, and εit is the 
error.  
  The independent variables include rate of bed occupancy, number of hospital 
services offered, length of stay, and age of physical plant (Lewitz and Brooke, 1985). 
By using a DEA technique, for each hospital k we found a set of weights, w
k, and an 
efficiency score, θk, where the weights are those conditions which maximize the 
apparent performance of the observed hospital. This measurement refers basically to 
technical efficiency, with variable returns to scale: 
 
F1 (y, x | V, S) = min {λ : λ ⋅ x Є L (y) |  V,  S}       (5) 
 
0≤  F1 (y, x | V, S) ≤ 1, where L (y) represents all possible input x combinations, given 
the output vector y. If λ* = 1, than the inputs can’t be further reduced while keeping 
output constant, so the hospital is technically efficient. If λ* < 1, than the hospital is 
technically inefficient.   Estimation of Romanian hospitals efficiency in relation to hospital market competition 
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  The effect of the neighbouring hospitals’ efficiency on a hospital’s efficiency 
is expressed by: 
 
Effk = β0 + β1Eff –k + γ Xk  +  εi               (6) 
 
where Eff –k is the mean efficiency of the other hospitals in region, Xk stays for other 
factors influencing a hospital’s efficiency, and εi is the error. The assumption is that a 
better technical efficiency of the hospitals in the region lowers the costs inferred by a 
given hospital, and thus increases its technical efficiency. 
 
4.  Results  
 
  For our sample of 20 teaching and research hospitals located in Bucharest, a 
mean technical efficiency score of 0.5674 was found, with a standard deviation of 
0.2343, meaning that, on average, the hospitals observed could have reduced their 
inputs by almost 57%, while obtaining the same outputs then before, on the condition 
that they were more efficient (in other words, 57% of the hospitals from the sample 
fell below the efficiency frontier). It was also proven that differences in costs per case 
in various hospitals result from variations in the length of stay. But costs are not 
significantly influenced by market concentration, measured by the Hirschman – 
Herfindahl index. We may presume that a monopolistic market is likely to induce the 
use of cheaper equipments, or less complex procedures, while a real competition in the 
hospital market would force the players to increase their level of efficiency, in order to 
offer more at the same production costs, but there is no evidence on that. The only 
accountable fact is that a 10% increase in the average efficiency levels of its 
neighbouring hospitals leads to a 5% increase in the efficiency level of an individual 
hospital. Another observation is that Romanian hospitals tend to overproduce quantity, 
by accommodating, on average, 15% more patients than their normal capacity, by 
increasing the length of stay, which leads to an overcharging of the services they offer, 
which, nevertheless, for severe cases, may be perceived as unverifiable quality by the 
family of the patient, which is thus excepted from nursing activities. In addition, for 
teaching and research hospitals uncompensated care (charity cases), represented on 
average 6% of their total costs, in the studied period, which significantly burdened 
their budgets. The efficiency index for teaching and research hospitals, computed 










Efficiency index for the TRH sample in Bucharest 
 










The value 1 indicates the average efficiency level of Romanian hospitals. 
Hospitals scoring below 1 are efficient, while hospitals scoring above one are 
inefficient. The results obtained show that the teaching and research hospitals in 
Bucharest are rather inefficient, although the tendency is of decrease in overall 
inefficiency scores.  
  There aren’t any private teaching and research hospitals in Romania, so a 
comparison between the public not-for-profit and the private not-for-profit and for-
profit organizations in the field, taking into account the corresponding market 
orientation, couldn’t be performed. A hypothesis to be tested is that, in case such 
private units appear, their operating margins are likely to be higher than those of the 
state-owned hospitals, with a larger market share.  
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
  According to their mission, teaching and research hospitals are dedicated to 
educating students and residents, which may be regarded both as inputs (valuable 
medical force prepared to deliver quality health care services), and outputs (TRH offer 
both health and training outcomes). In order to assure a proper medical education, they 
need expensive, last generation equipment and, due to their particular clinical research 
interests, they usually attract the most complicated and severe cases from all over the 
country. This leads to corresponding increases in the length of stay, and in the cost per 
case, making them score poorly in the efficiency tests, falling below the efficiency 
frontier. In a competitive market, these elements would gradually leave them out of 
business.  
  But the hospital market, even under the circumstances of emergence of private 
businesses, remains idiosyncratic, in the sense that patients appreciate also the 
unverifiable quality, not directly connected with efficiency scores, but with 
subjectively perceived excellence, which may indeed influence the market share of a 
hospital. The future of the teaching and research hospitals resides in this unverifiable 
quality, which may attract, in the future, paying customers, and private medical  Estimation of Romanian hospitals efficiency in relation to hospital market competition 
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insurances agents, equilibrating their payment-to-costs balance. In other words, they 
must overproduce quality, instead of quantity, and this goal must replace the normal 
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